Introduction
Article 5(1) of Part II of the Federal Constitution (‘FC’) recognised the fundamental right of life of the people by providing that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty including detainee save in accordance with law. Therefore, the relevant authorities who are conferred with the responsibility of protection and care on behalf of the State shall not act inhumanely or negligently resulting in the detainee’s death. Hence, when the detainee died due to the wrongful act of the authorities, this gives rise to the legal issue as to whether s 8(2) of the Civil Law Act 1956 is an absolute bar to the award of exemplary damages in an estate claim?
Background Facts
The respondents were the wife and daughter of the deceased, Chandran a/l Perumal (‘Chandran’) and the joint administrator of his estate. They brought an action against the appellants for damages for causing Chandran’s death during his detention under Section 7 and Section 8 of the Civil Law Act 1956 (‘the CLA’) and breach of Chandran’s constitutional right to life under Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution (‘the FC’). The High Court found that Chandran’s death was caused by the appellants’ failure to accord Chandran the basic requirements of proper medication, medical care, food, drink and sleep and he was also physically injured. Thus, the appellants were not only found liable in the tort of negligence and but also for infringing Chandran’s constitutional right to life. Accordingly, exemplary damages of RM 200,000 for the infringement of Chandran’s constitutional right to life was awarded. Nevertheless, the appellants appealed against the grant of exemplary damages and the quantum of it. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court and dismissed the appeal.
Legal Issue
Whether s 8(2) of the Civil Law Act 1956 (‘CLA 1956’) is an absolute bar to the award of exemplary damages in an estate claim?
Decision
The Federal Court unanimously answered it in the affirmative. In light with the clear and unambiguous words ‘shall not include exemplary damages’ as part of the damages recoverable under S8(2) CLA 1956, it is well-settled that the court must give effect to its natural and ordinary meaning, relying, inter alia, on Pinner v Everett [1969] 1 WLR 1266, Tan Kim Chuan & Anor v Chandu Nair [1991] 2 MLJ 42; [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 441; Chin Choy & Ors v Collector of Stamp Duties [1979] 1 MLJ 69.
However, the court could depart from the strict interpretation of the statute when such interpretation would lead to an absurd situation which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature as ruled by the House of Lords in Nothman v Barnet London Borough Council [1978] 1 WLR 220 at p 228. As observed by the court, CLA 1956 is a pre-Merdeka Law so issue arises as to whether the court is empowered to invoke Article 162(6) of the FC to modify CLA 1956 as to allow the grant of exemplary damages. In this respect, the majority of the Federal Court took the view that this power would only be exercised when there is a conflict between CLA 1956 and FC. Accordingly, Rhodazariah Bujang FCJ in delivering majority judgment of the court finds that S8(2) of the CLA 1956 is not incongruous with Article 5 of the FC which welcomes the court to invoke the power under Article 162(6) of the FC.
Apart from that, the Federal Court observed that if the wrongdoer has died and the victim is allowed to claim exemplary damages against the wrongdoer’s estate, this would result in unfairness since ‘the retributive goal of a punitive award cannot be achieved: only the innocent heirs are punished’ as highlighted in Law Commission’s report at para 1.277. Based on the reasons above, the majority of the Federal Court Judges have decided not to exercise their power to remove the words ‘shall not include exemplary damages’ in S8(2) of the CLA 1956 as this would be contrary to the aim of exemplary damages i.e. to punish the wrongdoer.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the appellants are permitted to escape from the wrong that had been done to the deceased. This is because instead of awarding exemplary damages which was clearly prohibited by S8(2) of the CLA 1956, the Federal Court substituted it with aggravated damages to compensate the victim.
